standard Taxi Medallion Lease Agreement

Participants may choose to offer the following leases:Standard leasing contracts: lease-leasing contracts governed by TLC leasing limits. The taxi rental driver started at X and ends at X. Read the rules for the driver in the taxicab Leasing Pilot Resolution (PDF). The drivers of the old fleets, which represent about 1,800 taxis, are still unionized. The union contract limits the increase in the rental fee to half of the additional revenue generated by an increase in the ticket price. Thus, it is guaranteed that unionized floats will share equally the revenue from an increase in the ticket price with the owners of the fleet. Other taxi drivers are leaving. In part, they are constrained by competition for riders; If non-viable owners excessively increased rental fees, drivers would flock to unionized fleets. The industry also expects ticket price increases to be shared between owners and drivers, making it harder for landlords to take all ticket price increases. There is no doubt that the city`s regulations have marked almost every facet of the sector. The number of taxis is set by law at 11,787. No new taxi license has been issued for more than half a century, making the taxi-medallion (which is just an aluminum plate attached to the hood of each cab) the central symbol of the control system. And the regulation goes far beyond the cap of the medallion.

A municipal agency, the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), sets the price of the taxi, grants a license to taxi drivers and vehicles, adopts rules that taxi drivers and owners must follow, and performs a full inspection of each taxi three times a year. In summary, these critics believe that the medallion system artificially allows taxi owners to make huge profits that inflate the value of medallion licenses, while drivers with crumbs and the public leave behind with lax service. Has competition for desirable fares prompted taxi owners to improve their service? Have they reduced the surcharge (a reason why drivers prefer the flat price of FHVs)? Have taxi owners trained drivers on airport roads? Have owners improved the quality of their cars? Each of those measures would constitute a competitive response to the increasing proportion of VHFs in airport travel. Taxi owners did not take any of them. Instead, they escaped the airport`s activities. As part of a rental agreement, a driver pays the owner of a taxi a lump sum for each shift or week. The driver then has for this period the exclusive use of the cabin. Owners will be guaranteed the rental fee for each shift (or week) during which the taxi is rented, regardless of the driver`s actual working time or the amount of money received by the driver. Drivers` revenues are the difference between their total revenue (fares and tips) and their expenses (rental fees and gasoline). TLC has increased the price of taxis twice in the last 15 years: by 22% in May 1987 and by 12% in January 1990.14 Critics believe that the increase in ticket prices does not help drivers, can be tested on the basis of the facts concerning the fare increases of 1987 and 1990. We can check whether the drivers have benefited from the two ticket price increases by first looking at the statements for the drivers who take care of the taxi owners` taxis, and then for the owner drivers.

Why don`t taxi owners increase rental fees to absorb all the extra revenue generated by each increase in ticket price? The answer to this question lies in the details of a union contract, the competition for drivers between industrial segments and a sense of fairness that exists both between owners and between drivers. . . .